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The offshore islands of Taiwan (Republic of China) are dynamic examples of contested metageographies,
island spaces caught in between competing and opposing interpretations of their identities, relativities,
notions of sustainability and futures. Three cases e (1) population growth, land use conﬂict, a switch
from a military to a tourism economy, and ever closer links between mainland China and Kinmen Island;
(2) the rejection of a move to establish a casino economy on the Penghu archipelago; and (3) protests
against the storage of spent nuclear waste on Orchid Island e are presented as illustrative of such
changing topographies, themselves reﬂective of a transition to a more democratic and pluralist society in
Taiwan. The paper hints at an evolving shift in both vertical (top/down) and horizontal (island-to-island)
relations in the construction of development paths and futures for Taiwan’s de facto archipelago. This re-
territorialization offers a fresh, archipelagic repivoting of political geography for and beyond Taiwan.
 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Introduction
“What the map cuts up, the story cuts across” (de Certeau, 1988,
p. 129).
The anomalous political status of Taiwan/Republic of China, and
its relationship with the People’s Republic of China is a subject of
keen international and multi-disciplinary scholarship (Chen, 2013;
Chiu, 1979; Hickey, 2009). What is often neglected in this literature
e and as is common in various jurisdictions that are, or include,
archipelagos (Baldacchino, 2012) e is that ‘Taiwan’ is more than
just the one main island that bears this name; this island does not
constitute “the sum total” of the polity’s territory since 1949 (Berry
& Lu, 2005, p. 3). Rather, Taiwan (the main island) is engaged in a
domestic relationship with a series of offshore islands; these
extend to the coastal zone of mainland China, to the Diaoyutai
islands in the East China Sea (a claim disputed by Japan, which calls
them the Senkaku islands); and as far as Taipin (or Itu Aba) Island,
the largest member of the Spratly island chain, in the South China
Sea (a claim also disputed, this time by no less than six regional
powers). All together, some 121 islands form the archipelago that
comprises the current jurisdiction of Taiwan (see Table 1).
Taiwan’s offshore islands are lessons in diversity: of size, pop-
ulation, remoteness, history, natural beauty, indigenous people and
touristic appeal. Within this diversity lurk competing notions and
presumptions of how these islands could and should develop, what
functions they could and should serve, and for whom.
Since the late 1940s, the de facto national government of Taiwan
in Taipei has peddled its own interpretation of the islands’ function/
s within the overall national imaginary: these include military
outposts, high security prisons, waste disposal sites, ﬁshing
grounds, tourism sites, nature parks, and cultural reserves for
indigenous people and their customs. Since 2000, this central
government has also tended to drive forward a model of island
development that has focused largely on projects to promote
infrastructural self-sufﬁciency; and, more recently, on an inter-
pretation of sustainable development that privileges protection and
conservation, ensures the overall welfare and quality of life of is-
landers, and promotes tourism appeal.
Local interests however, have not always embraced these rep-
resentations. In some cases, the transition-in-progress implicit in
these projections dovetails with local islanders’ aspirations; such as
for peaceful co-existence and economic development (on Kinmen
Island); though concerns relating to the consequences of mass
tourism may be on their way. Meanwhile, other state-driven con-
ceptualizations of what should be the role of Taiwan’s offshore
islands have been questioned, challenged and opposed. In a couple
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of high proﬁle instances, locals have rejected initiatives to establish
a casino economy (on Penghu); and strongly protested against the
storage of spent nuclear waste (on Orchid Island).
This paper
This paper describes the competing island topographies
involved in these disputes. We present a set of contested island
imaginaries, focussing on the extensive archipelago that makes up
the jurisdiction of Taiwan. The history of these offshore islands as
components of Taiwan has been relatively short and recent: Taiwan
is a jurisdiction emerging from a devastating civil war in the late
1940s, and a leading member of the so-called four ‘Asian Tigers’ or
‘Little Dragons’ (Gregory, Johnston, Pratt,Watts, &Whatmore, 2009,
p. 38; Vogel, 1991). Its various islands are, and have been, platforms
for the unfolding of differing and contrasting interpretations (as
much as of anxieties) of identity, positioning and geo-politics. The
transformation of the incorporation of small islands into the na-
tional psyche and imaginary of Taiwan is a result of a democratic
transition, as well as of a stronger voice and presence of islander
voices at the negotiating and visioning table. In this way, we re-
territorialize and pivot ‘Taiwan’ archipelagically, presenting it in
contra-distinction to other dominant representations of this same
jurisdiction: particularly from Beijing/People’s Republic of China
(PRC), and from Taipei/Republic of China (ROC) itself. What unfolds
is an exercise in the mechanics and dynamics of mapping that
aligns with the topography of (in this case, de facto) state formation
and evolution; a rich territorialization that unfolds in relation to
changing conceptualizations andmanifestations of a national space
that is both material and affective (Brighenti, 2010a, 2010b).
Of course, we admit and acknowledge that this revisioning ex-
ercise ﬂies in the face of Beijing’s and Taipei’s own ofﬁcial in-
terpretations of their territorial claims. And it is perhaps for such
reasons that the current de facto operation of Taiwan as an archi-
pelagic jurisdiction remains under-acknowledged. And yet,
unfolding domestic politics are raising questions of island gover-
nance and exacerbating this archipelagic ‘turn’: the islands of, and
off, Taiwan are promoting, and being promoted as, self-evident
topos of geographical plurality. In any case, the 1991 amend-
ments to the Constitution of the Republic of China can be seen to
imply that its current jurisdiction is equivalent to the island of
Taiwan and its offshore islands (Chow, 2007, p. 107; Taiwan
Constitution, 2013). Since then, there have been moves to
implicitly recognize the nature of the island state and to speciﬁcally
promote the welfare of residents of its offshore small islands,
particularly via the Offshore Islands Development Act of 2000
(OIDA, 2009). Furthermore, the claiming of Taiwan as an ‘Ocean
Country’ is mentioned in the Ocean Policy White Paper of 2006
(RDEC, 2006).
To make and sustain such an argument, this paper is organized
as follows. We ﬁrst situate our concern within the burgeoning
literature on islands as enclaves or excised sites of jurisdiction,
suggesting that islands are more pliable spaces with(in) which to
practise inbordering, carving out or reconﬁguring speciﬁc eco-
nomic, environmental or military functions that need not, and
should not, spill over elsewhere. We also explain why we have
chosen Taiwan to ground and ﬂesh out our concerns; and to sup-
port our case graphically with what we consider to be a more
suitably archipelagic map of Taiwan. Next, we offer a brief twen-
tieth century history of Taiwan that privileges the changing use
values of outlying islands in the context of the unfolding of re-
lations between ROC and PRC. This is the lead-up to a review of
three case studies from three of these island groups e Kinmen,
Penghu and Orchid e that illustrate an emerging pluralism in
Taiwanese politics whereby different and multiple interpretations
of island identities are now being articulated, championed and/or
resisted, and invoking scenarios quite different from a judicious
offshoring meant to keep risky, undesirable or suspicious elements
at bay. Case studies from different island groups, such as the
Daioyutai (the Senkaku) and Taipin Island (Itu Aba) e very much in
the news in recent months (Corcuff, 2013; Ogden, 2013) e would
have offered material for other spatial imaginaries; but such an
analysis will have to wait for a separate paper.
This re-imagining of Taiwan as archipelago is thus a reﬂection of
unfolding power relations within Taiwan itself. We discuss the
implications of these observations, with respect to both the current
governance of Taiwan and its possible futures when reframed
archipelagically.
Islands ﬁt the bill
“Islands. bounded but porous; isolated, connected, colonized,
postcolonial; redolent of the performative imaginary; vulner-
able to linguistic, cultural, environmental change; robust and
able to absorb and modify . utopian and dystopian, tourist
meccas, ecological refugia” (Stratford, 2003, p. 495).
Table 1
Basic data on Taiwan’s offshore islands (updated: February 2014).
Name of island
group
No. of islands
in group
Relative location County Closest distance to
mainland Taiwan (km)
Largest island
in group (sq km)
Total area of
island group (sq km)
Population (2013)
Kinmen 13 Xiamen Bay,
Mainland China
Kinmen, Fuchien
Province
227 134 150 120,037
Matsu 19 Northern Fujian,
Mainland China
Lien-Chiang,
Fuchien Province
211 8.4 29.6 11,196
Penghu 64a Taiwan Strait Penghu 40 64 127 98,843
Green Island 1 Eastern Taiwan Taitung 33 15 15 3580
Orchid Island 2 South-Eastern Taiwan Taitung 90 47 48 4905/4194b
Liuchiu Island 1 South-Western Taiwan Pintung 15 7 7 12,415
Turtle Island 2 North-Eastern Taiwan Ilan 10 3 3 Military post
Keelung Islands 4 North to Keelung Keelung 5 1 2 None
Diaoyutai Islands 8 East China Sea Ilan 185 5 6 None
Pratas Islands 3 South China Sea Kaoshiung City 440 2 2 Military post
Taiping Island 1 Spratly Group,
South China Sea
Dept of Defence 1600 0.5 0.5 Military post
Others 3 0.02
Total 121 387.6 250,976
a 90 Islands in all, if very small islets are included.
b Indigenous population on island.
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Metageography refers to “the set of spatial structures through
which people order their knowledge of the world: the often un-
conscious frameworks that organize studies of history, sociology,
anthropology, economics, political science, or even natural history”
(Lewis &Wigen, 1997, p. ix). Taylor (2001, p. 114) adds development
studies and international relations to this listing. The term reminds
us that places are not things; they are not objective speciﬁcities
whose existence usurps and transcends time, context and focus.
Instead, geographies are socially constructed, often serving ideo-
logical or imperial purposes; their implicit materiality, ﬁxity and
‘national unity’ are constructs that conceal other forces and in-
terests at work. Hence, there is a sheer impossibility of discussing
factual statements without the accompanying interlacing of myths
and metaphors. Moreover, the raw power of the political map in
shaping our views of the world is so great that metageographical
understandings in the contemporary era are often rooted in the
map of ‘sovereign’ states, even if and when the frame of reference
lies beyond the realm of political practice (Agnew, 1994; Sidaway,
2007b). Indeed, the very idea of a “territorial state as a uniﬁed,
bounded, homogeneous and naturally occurring entity” can itself
be traced to cartographic origins (Steinberg, 2005, p. 253). The
South China Sea is a regionwhere such mapping, counter-mapping
and counter-naming, are now all the rage. Since 2011, some prefer
to call this region the ‘West Philippine Sea’ (The Economist, 2012);
although Taiwan was quick to reject this renaming, and reiterated
its claim to sovereignty over the area (Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
ROC [Taiwan], 2011, 2012). Different countries have staked
different claims; but the PRC has been making the most assertive
and vociferous moves, both militarily and representationally. In
spite of their differences, the PRC and the ROC share common po-
sitions on their claims to the various islands in this region (Che,
2013).
Given their alluringly simple and self-evident boundedness,
islands are assemblages that are much disposed to this territorial-
izing exercise. Indeed, the representation and framing of islands as
distinct spaces e and often distinct polities or jurisdictions e cre-
ates a disposition for differentiated control and socio-political en-
gineering that departs from the norm: a practice that can be traced
back to the development of quarantine islands in Venice and Genoa
in the 14th century. In line with various creation myths, islands
have deﬁnitively shifted “from the register of the ‘found’ to the
register of the ‘made’” (Sloterdijk, 2006, p. 279). Sidaway (2007a, p.
352) has identiﬁed a wider tendency in contemporary times on the
part of governments to condone, or even instigate, a progressively
more variegated zonal capitalism, or a “complex and uneven
experience of selective boundary crossings, subjectivities and ex-
clusions”. This is a practice of excision that, for islands, has taken
themeaning of offshore to a completely new level (Agamben, 2005;
Palan, 2003). Some islands can also be bought, leased or sold: a new
pastime for the rich (Private Islands On-Line, 2008). The engineered
Palm Islands of Dubai, or The World archipelago close by, are
contemporary examples of this manufactured offshoreness
(Jackson & Della Dora, 2009; Junemo, 2004). For some, islands are
hot private regions, evenwithin the virtual spatiality of Second Life,
offering “the most ﬂexibility and privacy” (Second Life, 2009). This
making and engineering of island enclaves is a source of tension
and contestation in islandemainland relations around the world
(Baldacchino, 2010a). The strategic (re-)engineering of jurisdic-
tional space allows the state to earmark speciﬁc territory for equally
special, and specialized, services (Mountz, 2013); in this task of
enclaving, islands are already “a sort of outside” (Harvey, 2003, p.
14) and sites for such “creative exercises in power” (Mountz, 2011,
p. 118); and so they ﬁt the bill perfectly. A quick global scan of such
‘services’ reveals detention camps, quarantine sites, offshore
ﬁnance centres, low-tax havens, enterprise processing zones,
geostrategic military bases, remote weapons test and dump sites,
special autonomous regions, duty-free zones, heritage and con-
servation parks, spaces without right of abode, and various com-
binations of the above (Baldacchino, 2010a, p. 191).
Though they may wish to, states rarely act unilaterally in the
process of such a re-territorialization: there are competing versions
and interpretations, utopias and dystopias, of the ways in which
islands are re/presented and imagined; and there are different ca-
pacities available to the different players e including islanders e
that can help to consolidate, tweak or fray the dominance of any
particular representation/s over others. Islands are “anxious
spaces” (Jackson & Della Dora, 2009) that play out competing
metageographies, even as these representations are performed as
factual pronouncements, brands, visioning statements or ‘natural’
attributes.
Like many other countries in East and South Asia, Taiwan is not
exempt from having to deal with its own set of contested islands.
However, these are commonly understood as island spaces that are
claimed by more than one jurisdiction. In Taiwan’s case, it claims
the Diaoyutai, eight small volcanic islets in the East China Sea; they
are called Senkaku by the Japanese, who claim them as their own
and effectively control them (McCormack, 2011). Meanwhile,
Taiping Island, within the Spratly island group, is the site of a
Taiwanese naval garrison; there are, however, no less than six
countries with territorial claims over the Spratly island group
(Womack, 2011). Islands are iconic spaces for the pursuit of
nationalist agendas; and though they may be small, their posses-
sion implies control over vast expanses of ocean and marine re-
sources (Anderson, 1993).
Justiﬁcations
We choose to ﬂesh out these anxieties in relation to the islands
of Taiwan, for a variety of interlocking reasons. First, the uniquely
problematic status of Taiwan/Republic of China (henceforth,
Taiwan) since 1949 is a focus of considerable regional and inter-
national scholarship (Kastner, 2009). The Communist Party that
rules the Chinese mainland and the Nationalist Party (KMT) that
has dominated Taiwanese politics have a long-standing quarrel
whose parameters have changed with time. Initially, the Republic
of China was the original government established since 1911; but a
civil war broke out between two regimes each of which wanted to
govern all of China; after the founding of the PRC (with Mao Tse-
Tung at its helm) in 1949, and the relocation of the (former) Gov-
ernment of China (with Chiang Kai-Shek in charge) to Taiwan, this
struggle had some violent episodes (more below); but increasingly
took on the hues of what has been described as ‘chequebook di-
plomacy’, with each side seeking to muster exclusive recognition as
the single, legitimate government of China from the international
community (Madsen, 2001; McElroy & Bai, 2008). The contempo-
rary phase is more conciliatory; the PRC has proposed Taiwan as a
‘special administrative region’, a status similar to that of Hong
Kong; but Taiwan has rejected this suggestion (Cooper, 1995, pp.
93e124). But, meanwhile, both sides have made a series of positive,
incremental steps to facilitate bilateral trade, tourism, trans-
portation and “geo-economic integration” (Lim, 2012). This
ongoing focus on the Beijing-Taipei nexus has tended to dampen or
deﬂect interest in this other political geography, that of Taiwan’s
internal island space.
Second, for many years, Taiwan’s central government in Taipei
has been largely dictating the development of some of its islands
unilaterally, invoking strategy and martial law (Szonyi, 2008, p. 9);
this has dampened or subdued the generation of counter-
representations at the local level. More recently, however, a thaw
in relations across the Taiwan Strait (see more below) has created
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opportunities for more democratic policy contestation and an
increasing plurality of opinions and representations, which deserve
their own recognition and critique.
Third, much of the scholarship that has focused on Taiwan’s
offshore islands is concerned with the protection of biodiversity,
cultural heritage, or the promotion of tourism; and it is only of late
that dialogue is underway to plan sustainable development tra-
jectories that serve resident needs and go beyond promoting con-
struction projects or strict conservation practices. This dialogue is
bound to trigger a wider plurality of vision for the offshore islands’
futures.
We contend that such an archipelagic sensibility with regards to
Taiwan is a useful technique for highlighting how the different
jurisdictional powers wielded by the various island communities
contours the manufacturing of island representations. This analysis
therefore hopes to offer a more nuanced understanding of the
problematique associated with archipelagos; one that includes
considerations of peer-to-peer, islandeisland connectivities.
Islands of diversity
“Other discoveries await on the outlying islands of Taiwan, from
the distinctive terrain of the Penghu Islands to the sea-eroded
rock formations and eastern Fujian culture and stone houses
on Matsu in the Taiwan Strait, to the natural beauty of the
remote Orchid Island and Green Island in the southeast Paciﬁc”
(Taiwan Tourism Bureau, 2011a).
Straddling the Tropic of Cancer, right on the fault line where the
Euro-Asian and Philippine continental plates meet, Taiwan enjoys
an extremely diversiﬁed topography and natural environment. This
endowment is also shared by Taiwan’s various offshore islands,
classiﬁed into 11 distinct groups. There are granite-origin conti-
nental islands, close to the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC)
southeast coastline, such as Kinmen and Matsu island groups; mid-
ocean archipelagos, like the Penghu group; volcanic oceanic
islands, such as Green Island, Orchid Island and Turtle Island; and
islands on raised coral reefs or atolls, such as Little Liuchiu Island
(Liuchiuyu) and Pratas (Tsai, 2002, pp. 397e402). These islands are
presented in the tourism literature as each being able to offer a
distinct location, topographical characteristics and (where inhabi-
ted) human activities; each has its own unique scenery, geology,
biogeography and culture. Thus, each island can offer something
different, “satisfying the various needs of visitors, whether these
have a natural, historical or cultural nature, or simply consist of
sightseeing, snorkelling or sport ﬁshing” (Taiwan Tourism Bureau,
2011b).
Taiwan’s offshore islands have only been lumped together
within the same ‘state’ boundary after 1945 (end of World War II),
and following the establishment of an ROC government in Taipei in
1949, after the communist victory in mainland China. Thereafter,
relations between Taiwan and mainland China have been tense.
Although ‘the Taiwan Question’ (Hamrin &Wang, 2004) is currently
subdued, both Beijing and Taipei have considered military inter-
vention to force the impasse. Unlike the ROC, the PRC has not
committed to abandoning the use of force on the issue. In such a
scenario, martial law was imposed on all Taiwan’s coastlines and
offshore islands; for decades, the livelihoods of the residents of
Taiwan’s inhabited islands have depended largely on ﬁshing, agri-
culture and military spending.
Martial law was lifted frommost of the offshore islands in 1987;
and then from both island groups of Kinmen (ofﬁcially, Kinmen
county of Fujian province, ROC) and Matsu (Lien-chiang county of
Fujian province, ROC) in 1992. This decision increased public access
to coastal and insular areas, at the same time that signiﬁcant eco-
nomic growth in Taiwan was creating a public increasingly able to
afford, and interested in, outdoor recreation and vacationing. This
situation ushered in a change in the representation of the Taiwa-
nese offshore space from military frontier to tourism playgrounds
in biogeographically and culturally rich environments. The Penghu
archipelago (or Pescadores) e ofﬁcially, Penghu county of Taiwan
province, ROC e was the target of an early proposal for develop-
ment as a national scenic area, meant to maintain a balance be-
tween preservation and tourism utilization, and launched in 1991
(Ni & Chang, 2006: 6). Green Island’s marine recreational national
scenic area followed in 1990; as did the ones on Little Liuchiu Island
in 1990 (as part of a larger Tapeng Bay national scenic area, and
connected to Taiwan southwest coastal zone in 2000), and on
Matsu in 1999. Part of Kinmen was designated a national park in
1995. Green Island, which had served as a site of exile for political
prisoners during the martial law period of Taiwanese history, and
which had held some of Taiwan’s most dangerous criminals, has
seen its prison facilities converted into the Green Island Human
Rights Memorial Park in 1999. Pratas Atoll (or Dongsha) was
designated as part of Taiwan’s ﬁrst marine national park in 2007.
Coastal areas in particular have undergone a sudden and radical
reversal of fortune: from ‘no-go’ zones to popular ‘sun, sea and
sand’ tourism destinations. The ﬁnal stage of this transition to the
peaceful use of island spaces, and the incorporation of dark his-
tories into cultural products, was achieved in June 2013 when the
last outstanding landmines in the Kinmen island group were
cleared (The China Post, 2013).
Emergent in this context are some local ‘products’ that have
come to strongly represent what some of these offshore islands
stand for. Such ‘brands’ stand alone but also ride on the presumed
allure of the particular island onwhich they are located, and its own
‘place branding’ campaigns (Anholt, 2006; Baldacchino, 2010b),
with which they are intimately associated. Liquor, known as kao-
liang, is now a powerful brand in its own right. It is made from
sorghum: originally introduced as a drought-resistant grain in 1952
to swap with imported rice from mainland Taiwan under a crop-
exchange policy, sorghum also provided a local solution to the
drinking needs of thousands of soldiers stationed on Kinmen and
Matsu (Szonyi, 2008, pp. 128e129; Tsai, 2003, p. 215; Zhang,
2010b). The lucrative industries are owned by the respective
county governments and provide considerable operating revenue
to the two county administrations. Both island groups have also
become living museums of “traditional Fujian architecture as well
as western-traditional hybrid architectural styles created by
returned overseas Chinese” (Szonyi, 2008, p. 209). Cleavers made
from the stainless steel cases of spent bomb cartridges, and peanut
candy (both private business initiatives), make for other notable
Kinmen souvenirs (Zhang, 2010a, 2010b). In Penghu, the special
basalt geological formation and traditional co-evolved techniques
on ﬁshing and farming (including stone weirs and stone-walled
gardens) serve as educational and tourist allures (F. L. Tsai, 2009;
H.-M. 2009); recent plans speak of a strong investment in wind
energy to bolster the islands’ economic fortunes (Chang, 2011;
Taipei Times, 2012a).
The development trajectory of Taiwan’s inhabited offshore
islands started receiving speciﬁc and non-security driven policy
attention in the 1990s as targets of tourism development or con-
servation efforts. In 2000, with the enactment of the Offshore
Islands Development Act, construction and industry, environ-
mental assets, cultural characteristics and the general quality of life
started being promoted via an Offshore Island Development Fund
(Jou & Tsai, 2000). However, the focus gravitated to infrastructure
projects, and saturation levels on various small islands were soon
reached: “unnecessary constructions began to impact [upon] the
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fragile ecologies while essential welfare services remained unim-
proved” (Liu, 2007, p. 2). To rectify this, legislationwas amended (in
2001, and again in 2005) to ensure that development schemes
would be submitted by the islands’ own administrations, and with
due consideration towards sustainable practices, rather than driven
unilaterally from or by Taipei (CEPD, 2005; Jou & Tsai, 2000; Royle &
Tsai, 2008).
Meanwhile, the situation in Taiwan’s uninhabited islands is
different. Although the strained relations between the ROC and
PRC have eased in recent years, the government in Taipei has
maintained a defence-driven approach in regard to most of its
offshore, uninhabited island spaces. While these uninhabited
islands are now largely protected from ‘development’ by legisla-
tion, and should “as much as possible be listed as protected areas”
avoiding the excessive exploitation of local natural resources
(Council for Economic Planning and Development, 2005: Section
III, Article 2), they are also considered to be suitable platforms for
“necessary” exclusive military, meteorological, navigation and
other technical purposes: serving mainly as scientiﬁc stations and
military outposts (Council for Economic Planning and
Development, 2005: Section III, Article 2). Lesser Orchid Island
was subjected to target practice by military aircraft during 1984e
1994; this practice has now been stopped, perhaps instigated by
public protests. Within the Matsu group, “the secretive military-
controlled islands of Gaodeng and Liang are closed to the pub-
lic” (The Best of Matsu, 2010, p. 5). Taiwan also keeps combat-
ready marines on both Pratas Atoll and Taiping Island, in sup-
port of its sovereignty claims in this disputed region (Chuang,
2011).
Contested representations: a visual conundrum
Taiwan’s islands have thus been the peripheral, remote targets
and beneﬁciaries of investment from a paternalist state. But the
situation has been changing: with a growing sense of democrati-
zation and various measures of pro-growth economic liberalization
in Taiwan, especially since the 1990s (Hsu, 2009; Rigger, 2011), local
citizens and civil society increasingly can, and do, challenge the
initiatives and visions of the Taiwan government, and e with spe-
ciﬁc reference to the thrust of this paper e the Taiwanese govern-
ment’s intent with regards the functions and roles to be performed
by the offshore islands within its purview.
At this point, wewanted to present a visual conﬁguration of this
change with an appropriate map. But here, what was initially a
casual search became problematic: we were ﬁrst confounded and
then disturbed by what offerings were available. Few maps present
thewhole extent of Taiwan’s jurisdictional reach, and this is not just
because of the dispersed location of its offshore islands. Most maps
in the public domain, as well as via Google Images, show Taiwan’s
‘main island’ standing in the centre, with most of the offshore small
islands out of the frame completely, or with some included as an
inset; unless the map focuses deliberately on a particular island or
island group. We should not have been surprised that our critique
of a Taipei-led Taiwanese development programme was fully
matched and served by the visual renderings and subtle bias of that
country’s maps. After all, maps (like histories) “name, order, and
confer meanings to space” (Okihiro, 2010, p. 745). We therefore
could not present an image of the offshore islands of Taiwan as a
cluster of small dots surrounding a much larger, central, Taiwanese
mainland; indeed, this was the best that we could ﬁnd. We were
thus obliged to reﬂect on developing our own, alternative map, one
that would lie in a speciﬁc way, and ‘walk the talk’ of our argument.
Maps construct, speak and legitimize extant power relations. Hence
Map 1, adapted fromGoogle Earth, that accompanies this paper. It
adopts a general ENEeWSW orientation. What we especially like
about it is that: (1) it shows the locations of all the offshore islands
of (or claimed by) Taiwan (and without resorting to insets), and
including those islands in East China Sea and South China Sea; (2) it
reminds us that the main island of Taiwan is just one other island in
the North-West Paciﬁc (in fact, at 35,806 km2, it is slightly larger
than Hainan and its 33,210 km2); and (3) it presents the whole
sprawling Taiwan archipelago as overshadowed by the size and
vicinity of the People’s Republic of China (but itself constitutionally
part of the ROC).
Three episodes
Since the 1990s, there is growing evidence in Taiwan of
confrontation, competition and negotiation of visions and repre-
sentations of the future by local interests, even if this appears to be
primarily a movement that blocks initiatives (rather than one that
proposes them). Two episodes that relate to the offshore islands
stand out in recent Taiwanese history as exemplary of such blocking
manoeuvres: the disposal of nuclear waste on Orchid Island/Pongso
Map 1. A different map of Taiwan, sensitive to its de facto archipelagic character.
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noTau; and the rejection of a proposal to build and operate a casino
on Penghu. A third episode, still brewing, relates to the very rapid
change in the designation of Kinmen from frontlinemilitary zone to
a tourism destination and gateway to mainland China. These three
examples are emblematic indicators of a de facto “spatial turn”
(Hess-Lüttich, 2012) in Taiwanese politics and identity, demon-
strative of how acts of inbordering and enclaving of domestic space
are no longer uncompromisingly top-down, driven by and from
Taipei.
Case 1 e living in between on Kinmen
Kinmen (which means golden gate; also known in the local
dialect as Quemoy) is an island chain with a resident population of
around 120,000 (Kinmen County Government, 2013) and a total
land area of just 150 km2. Their livelihood has historically depen-
ded largely on ﬁshing and on the remittances of migrants who had
found employment elsewhere in the region, particularly Singapore
and other Southeast Asian countries. But Kinmen’s very particular
location assumed signiﬁcant strategic importance after 1949: some
of its islands are located less than 1 km from the territory of the
PRC, while lying more than 200 km from its other ‘mainland’,
Taiwan.
The ROC initially saw Kinmen as the launching pad for the in-
vasion and resumption of its control over mainland China. But the
Maoist regime targeted it as the obvious stepping stone for an
eventual full-scale invasion of Taiwan. The island was the site of a
historic battle of Kuningtou in 25e27 October 1949, a botched in-
vasion that halted the Communist advance. Kinmen was then
heavily bombed by the PRC for 44 days in 1958; and propaganda
bombs rained pro-communist leaﬂets down on its inhabitants
every other night for the next 20 years. As tense frontier sites be-
tween the ‘free world’ and the communist regime during the Cold
War (Myers, 1996), the Kinmen islands (along with the Matsu
islands, further up the Fujian coast), were signiﬁcantly militarized.
At one point, some 100,000 Taiwanese soldiers were stationed
there. Most of the land and coastal areas became tightly controlled,
with limited access even to resident civilians. Considerable state
funds were injected for geostrategic purposes, including the ability
to survive a long blockade. Thus, strictly regulated efforts got un-
derway to promote reforestation, ensure an adequate water supply,
boost agricultural and pastoral land to secure food self-sufﬁciency,
and introduce drought-resistant sorghum for the mass production
of liquor (kaoliang) for export as a source of income (Tsai, 2003, pp.
212e215; Clark & Tsai, 2009, pp. 159e160).
Cross-strait relations have however markedly improved in
recent years; and Kinmen has transited “from battleﬁeld to cross-
strait bridge” (Taiwan Today, 2011a). Even in tenser times, Kin-
men served as an unofﬁcial meeting point, a ‘no man’s land’, where
either party feels comfortable to meet discreetly and discuss issues
of common concern (Huang, 2004). Kinmenwas the site of the ﬁrst
cross-strait meeting in four decades to discuss humanitarian
assistance in 1990, as well as to handle the return of illegal immi-
grants from mainland China (Mainland Affairs Council, 2009); it
was part of the ‘mini three-links’ framework, established in 2001,
which permitted limited postal, transport and cross-border trade
between several port cities in China’s Fujian province, and Taiwan-
held islands (including Matsu). On February 10, 2002 (two days
before the Chinese New Year), for the ﬁrst time in 53 years,
Taiwanese businesspersons with Kinmen residential status could
start travelling between mainland China and Taiwan via Xiamen
harbour and Kinmen (rather than the lengthy detour via Hong
Kong) (Clark & Tsai, 2002). It is now catering to mainland Chinese
tourists “by converting military facilities into tourist traps and
building museums with wartime themes” (Jennings, 2007). Its
association with military episodes has fuelled the development of
“battleﬁeld tourism” supported by both state initiative and petty
entrepreneurship (Szonyi, 2008; Zhang, 2010a, 2010b). Within a
ﬂourishing cultural industry, spent steel bomb casings are literally
transformed into souvenir cutting knives (Yang & Hsing, 2001).
Kinmen is now also a designated “duty-free island for luxury
goods”, with stores for cosmetics, cigarettes, handbags and wine
(Taiwan Today, 2011a). Along with its traditional Fujian style, red
brick architecture and the abundant wild life in its nature reserves,
the islands are proving a signiﬁcant tourist attraction: PRC tourists
have been “. keen to explore this ‘mysteriousmilitary bastion’ that
the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] surprisingly failed to capture”
(Zhang, 2010a, p. 413).
In spite of all this re-connecting and development, there are
some evident tensions, some of which are typical of small islands
witnessing large increases in tourist numbers. The population
density is high and getting higher e population records show a
staggering increase from 47,339 in 1995 to around 120,000 in 2013
e with a rapidly increasing population lured by lower taxes,
attractive welfare beneﬁts and economic prospects (The China Post,
2009a). Land is scarce, and arable and habitable land is even scarcer
given the designated nature reserves. As the Taiwanese military
continues its landmine-clearing operations along Kinmen’s coasts,
some 154 ha of land currently within Kinmen National Park will be
released from military safety restrictions. The local residents are
calling for the land to be made available to them, claiming that it
once belonged to their ancestors (Taipei Times, 2010a). But an even
more serious issue may be round the corner.
In January 2011, Kinmen’s bridging qualities assumed a more
permanent, physical character: preliminary work started on a
5.4 km bridge linking Kinmen to Leiyu, or Little Kinmen Island
(8000 residents and a land area of 14 km2). The proposal for such a
bridge was ﬁrst put forward in 1993 by the Kinmen County Council.
The bridge is reportedly in its “ﬁnal design stage” (Chen, Yang, Kuo,
& Hwung, 2012, p. 1). After this bridge’s completion, expected in
2016, there are rumblings that a second bridge may be considered,
this time linking Kinmen to nearby Xiamen and the PRC; three
routings for such a structure have been submitted, and the CEPD
has already been exploring its feasibility (Taipei Times, 2009a,
2009b). Local government ofﬁcials said the construction of the
ﬁrst bridge would make a bridge between Little Kinmen and Xia-
men “more feasible” (Coonan, 2011). Other than a burden to tax-
payers, however, such a ﬁxed link may signiﬁcantly increase tourist
trafﬁc to the Kinmen island group, leading the islands down a path
of mass tourism and property inﬂation, as has occurred in other
cases (Baldacchino, 2007). True: the initiative “would be the most
potent symbol of reconciliation between the former enemies across
the Taiwan Strait yet”; but, would it be a “bridge too far” (Li, 2009)?
Case 2: the nuclear waste dump on Orchid Island
The ongoing saga surrounding the nuclear waste dumpsite on
Orchid Island (or Lanyu) has been described as a study in “envi-
ronmental colonialism” (Marsh, Lin, & Lin, 1993). The episode has
thrust Taiwan into debates about environmental justice and the
viability of a nuclear energy policy (Fan, 2006). It has also high-
lighted the growing political clout of indigenous nations, as Taiwan
moves further away from a top-down state and towards the
incorporation of indigenous movements, along with other vital
elements of civil society, within the democratic process (Hsiao &
Ho, 2010; Simon, 2010).
Taiwanese low-level nuclear waste from Taiwan’s three nuclear
power plants operated by state-owned Taipower, has been, since
1982, ‘temporarily’ stored on Orchid Island, the homeland of the
indigenous Tau (or Yami). An anti-nuclear waste movement, led by
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the native Tau islanders, mobilized in October 1987, when news
about the planned expansion of thewaste storage sitewas leaked to
the public. The movement gained nationwide visibility in February
1988 when Syaman Rapongan (a Tau activist and writer) and Kuo
Jian-ping (Tau name: Syaman Fungaye, a Presbyterian missionary),
with the support of the islanders and anti-nuclear groups, led
demonstrations in Taipei, capturing the attention of the media and
of a public largely unaware that any such dumping was going on. In
1991, during another round of nationwide protests, these two
young men handed a letter to Taipower, making three demands: a
stop to a planned expansion of the waste site; the immediate
stoppage of all nuclear shipments to Orchid Island; and the com-
plete shutdown of the storage site (Kuan, 2007; Marsh et al., 1993;
Syaman Rapongan, 2002). The ﬁrst two requests have been com-
plied with e the stoppage of more waste shipments to the island
only stopped in 1996, after even more protests e but the third
demand has proved elusive (Taipei Times, 2003). Seeking a per-
manent site for nuclear waste disposal remains uncertain: the
Taiwanese government has been considering various options,
including North Korea and the Solomon Islands (Gyorgy, 1997;
Space Daily, 2002), but also Wuqiu Island in Kinmen county
(Focus Taiwan, 2013). Taipower’s failure to stick to its promise of
removal of the waste from Orchid Island by 2002 e and now
extended to at least 2016 e has led to the regular articulation of
grievances among the tribe, supported by a broad ‘green’ alliance
(Taiwan Times, 2013). The Tau also allege bullying and wilful deceit
by the Taipei government (back in 1982, the local district
commissioner was deceived into thinking that what the Taiwan
government wanted to build on Orchid Island was just a ﬁsh can-
nery), a profound disrespect for their ancestral home, and serious
health issues from an invisible threat (deformed ﬁsh have been
caught in their ﬁshing grounds, close to the disposal site).
Indeed, a full-scale cultural revival was launched alongside the
anti-nuclear movement. There are various indigenous tribes in
Taiwan, whose culture and history has experienced a strong
connectionwith Paciﬁc islands; but none perhaps more so than the
Tau on Orchid Island, whose relative peripherality has protected
them from Sinicization. They are “among Taiwan’s remaining two
percent Austronesians in a sea of Han Chinese” (Arrigo, Huang, &
Chung, 2010, np). The indigenous Tau remain the large majority
of residents on Orchid Island which they call Pongso no Tau (the
island of the Tau people). For decades, Orchid Island (like Green
Island) was, in the sight of Taipei, more of a Taitung county back-
water, occupied by a ‘primitive’ ethnic group. But the increasing
local and international recognition of the rights of indigenous
people brought with it a better inter-cultural understanding and an
improved self-identity (Liu, 2007). In 2011, in celebration of the
100th anniversary of the Republic of China, si mangavang (the
traditional, hand-made grand plank-boat with 18 rowers), crossed
some 800 km of ocean, from Orchid Island to Taipei: a manifesta-
tion of pride in the Tau’s millenary ocean culture (Hou, 2011).
Case 3: casino tourism on Penghu
Gambling is banned in Taiwan, but proposals to legalize casinos
have been on the table at least since 1993e4, when the Penghu-
elected legislators approved an “offshore development act” that
included a proposal to allow the establishment of casinos operated
as joint ventures between reputable international casino ﬁrms and
local businesses (Jou & Tsai, 2000). Some local investors readily
purchased land and built hotels in anticipation of such a policy
move. After various setbacks, it was only in 2009 that the Kuo-
mintang (KMT) majority in Parliament secured the passage of a
national law legalizing casino gambling but only on Taiwan’s
outlying islands of Kinmen, Matsu and Penghu, and with the
permission of residents, obtained through a referendum; the op-
position Democratic People’s Party (DPP) legislators and other
parties (comprising environmental and religious groups) voted
against the bill, citing concerns about debt, crime and environ-
mental degradation (Asian Gaming, 2009). The suggestion dove-
tailed with plans to boost tourism on the islands, while containing
the gambling industry to its small island precincts. Some politicians
from the Penghu archipelago (including the county government),
and businesspersons fronted by the Penghu Business Association,
welcomed this proposal, saying that it would reinvigorate the
islands’ sluggish economy; and potential investors hailed Penghu
as an emergent “Hawaii or Bahamas-style resort destination for the
region” (Taipei Times, 2009c). Other islanders, however, allied with
university students and faith-based groups, opposed the plan on
the grounds that it would damage the natural environment and
undermine the social fabric of the residents (The China Post, 2009a,
2009b). In a referendum held on September 26, 2009, 56.4% of
Penghu voters disagreed with the proposal, effectively scuttling the
casino plan there. Voter turnout was 42%. Tellingly, the jubilant
‘Penghu Anti-casino Alliance’ held a press conference after the re-
sults of the referendum became known, in a Catholic Church hall;
and Buddhist priests were amongst the leading anti-casino activ-
ists. It sounds rather trite that, in a study after the referendum
result, one of the conclusions is that “. the relevant authorities
should consider the attitudes of local residents when considering
the gaming entertainment industry” (Tsai & Shiue, 2010, p. 117).
Following this rejection on Penghu, Matsu and Kinmen islanders
were next in line to vote in their own ‘casino referendum’ (The
China Post, 2011; Taiwan Today, 2011b). Matsu voters approved
their casino in July 2012 (Taipei Times, 2012b); and Caesars
Entertainment Corporation, a Las Vegas company, smelling an op-
portunity, has been “pursuing a licence for a casino on Kinmen”
(Macau Business Daily, 2012). Meanwhile, Penghu county govern-
ment is cooperating with the central government in Taipei to make
the islands a green-energy and low-carbon archipelago, an initia-
tive that is expected to become the special feature of Penghu’s
economy. The fall back economic option for Penghu is to promote
its natural and cultural assets for tourism. These feature “world-
class volcanic landscapes, a rich ecosystem and historic sites”,
including the oldest temple in the country dedicated to Mazu, the
Goddess believed to protect ﬁshers at sea (Taipei Times, 2010b). The
Basalt columns of Penghu isles have been recognized as of world-
class Geopark potential (Brunnsden & Lin, 2005); while six isles
in the archipelago have been designated as the Penghu Geopark by
the local government in 2007 (Lin, 2008), and joined the central
government supported Taiwan’s Geopark Network in 2011 (Council
of Agriculture, 2011).
Discussion I: local-central vs. island-to-island networks
The manner and extent to which local-central politics is played
out with regard to Taiwan’s offshore islands are signiﬁcantly
impacted by the jurisdictional capacity of local actors. Within Tai-
wan’s ofﬁcial suite of 121 islands (of which 20 are inhabited), levels
of local autonomy range from nil (in the case of the uninhabited
islands/military posts/scientiﬁc stations) to county government
status (in the case of Kinmen, Matsu and Penghu), and various
levels of governance in between. For decades, the outreach
connection from each island group has been channelled directly to
and from Taipei or Kaoshiung (the southern port and second city of
Taiwan) in political, economic and social terms. Not surprisingly,
transportation links reﬂect power dynamics: there has hardly been
any direct transportation between these island groups. However,
things are changing: an ‘Islands Development Collaboration Plat-
form’ set up by Kinmen, Penghu and Matsu was launched in 2011
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(IDCP, 2012). This unprecedented archipelagic alliance among Tai-
wan’s three county-level island governments is intended to facili-
tate cooperation in developing tourism and trade in the Taiwan
Strait, and to strengthen the islands’ economic capacity and
connections via direct, island-to-island exchanges. This turn is
visually captured in the accompanying map on the IDCP website
(see Map 2).
Moreover, in the three cases discussed above, various mecha-
nisms for the projection of speciﬁc island futures can be discerned.
Top-down national security and economic development interests
have, or are likely to, connect and clash with local resident objec-
tions, health and social value concerns, and appeals to the rights of
indigenous people, typically supported by ‘third sector’ organiza-
tions, ranging from temples and family shrines, to small businesses
and environmental groups. What makes these dynamics inter-
esting and insightful from a political geography perspective, how-
ever, is that they imply attempts at the excision, or enclaving, of
domestic space by Taipei. In other words, these initiatives, in spite
of their obvious differences, sought to construct a role and function
on an offshore island that was not deemed appropriate for main-
land Taiwan. There is no contradiction here: the Taiwanese gov-
ernment is strategically deploying the internal differentiation of
the territory under its jurisdiction, recognizing it effectively as an
“enforcement archipelago” (Mountz, 2011): a space where judi-
cious offshoring can keep undesirable or suspicious elements e
nuclear waste, gambling, a duty-free taxation regime e at bay,
minimizing and containing their costs and downsides, but at the
same time still reaping their associated beneﬁts. Meanwhile, in
Taiwan, the islanders’ own rights, their natural and cultural assets,
and their legitimate interest to have a say in their own futures, has
been increasingly recognized.
Discussion II: archipelago tensions
What about the analysis of these same multiplicities in the
context of the nature of the polity of Taiwan as de facto archipelago?
It is the geo-physically fragmented and unequally distributed
nature of the Taiwanese state that more easily naturalizes and le-
gitimates such a differential approach to development; whether
Taipei driven or locally inspired; and whether by population, land
area, political clout, economic heft. Indeed, Map 1 provides a visual
rendition particularly of Kinmen and Matsu as geographic outliers
of Taiwan, also given that they are both so much closer to the PRC.
In their respect, there is clearly no sense of a safe “internal sea”
(LaFlamme, 1983, p. 361), with “the waters surrounding its
component islands as being within its boundaries” (Lewis, 1974, p.
138), as is often expected among the attributes of archipelagos.
Yet, this “centrifugal tendency” (LaFlamme, 1983, p. 361) also
betrays a disposition towards horizontal, ‘island-to-island’ re-
lations; connectivities that avoid, but may even threaten and
destabilize, the still predominant but now increasingly challenged
mainland/island dialectic in understanding Taiwan’s relations to its
offshore lands and peoples. In the words of Stratford, Baldacchino,
McMahon, Farbotko, and Harwood (2011, p. 118), the islands of/off
Taiwan may have been too often conceived as “. separate from the
very archipelagos they may occupy or constitute (as if the did not
exist or had been rendered ghostly)”. We have noted some evidence
of such island-to-island conceptualizations so far: with, say, Pen-
ghu, Kinmen and Matsu acting in concert, developing common
positions, facing the central administration as one bloc. There is (so
far) an absence of island-based political parties or movements: out
of 209 registered political parties in Taiwan in 2011, not a single one
has a primarily offshore island base and constituency (Ministry of
the Interior, 2011). However, while the two main coalitions e the
KMT-led blue alliance and the DPP-led green alliance e maintain
strong voter support throughout Taiwan, they are not as well
entrenched in the offshore islands. Local, island-based groups e
such as patriarchal clans, chambers of commerce and farmer co-
operatives e are very inﬂuential in local politics; and their elected
representatives have the ear of the two major national alliances
(Hsiao, 1994). Indeed, three minor parties e the New Party, the
People First Party and Green Party e are making some inroads. In
the January 2012 legislative elections, the Green Party, which has
an anti-nuclear waste disposal, anti-casino, pro-wetland and pro-
coastal zone protection agenda, did relatively well in both Lanyu
and Penghu (Taiwan Environmental Information Center, 2012);
while the New Party and People First Party both fared relatively
well in both Kinmen and Matsu (Central Electoral Commission,
2012). Also, the Offshore Islands Development Acts were pro-
posed by politicians from Kinmen, Penghu and Matsu e and sup-
ported by both the KMT and DPP e since 1995. The relations which
matter, particularly in crafting development policy, may be shifting
to more multifocal, archipelagic ones (Jou & Tsai, 2000). “For island
scholars . the archipelago is a conceptual tool too little drawn
upon” (Stratford et al., 2011, p. 125); it is an idea that “easily lends
itself to all sorts of re-territorializations” (Westphal, 2012, p. 390).
For Taiwan, it has been an organizing principle that remains
scantily invoked: not enough stories cut across. But the situation is
changing.
Conclusion
Islandness is not simply a biophysical condition but a complex
assemblage of expressions of identity that attaches to places that
are smaller than continents and are completely surrounded by
water. These topographical identiﬁcations include strongly charged
and intuitive perceptions of what “the island” is and should be (its
identity, history and character; its future) as well of its relationality
and connectivity (typically to and with a looming and larger
mainland). Islands are tense “emotional geographies” (Stratford,
2008) that ﬂesh out our often implicit assumptions and un-
derstandings of ocean, sky and land; of ﬂows and boundaries; ofMap 2. A visualization of island-to-island relations amongst Taiwan’s islands.
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edges and interiors; of isolation and access (Clark, 2004;
DeLoughrey, 2004; Hay, 2006; Lowenthal, 2007; Royle, 2001).
Whether crafted by nature, built by people, or falling somewhere in
between, as in Utopia (More, 1516/2002), islands are ambivalent
spaces that highlight our fears and give vent to creative, sometimes
dark, expressions of power and sovereignty. Their perceived
smallness and ‘in betweenity’ (Baldacchino, 2008) increases the
likelihood that they be construed as project sites and planning
targets. All the more so by a ubiquitous, unitary, bureaucratic and
security-driven, industrializing state with a, still fresh, authori-
tarian past like Taiwan (Cumings, 1984).
Locals may now dare to differ. Just as Taiwan was experiencing
its ﬁrst steps as a democratic state, it was also experimenting with
differential governance: indeed, after 1987, the Kinmen and Matsu
island groups only were kept under martial law governed by a
special War Zone Administration Committee (WZAC), until 1992.
Since then, Taiwan has struggled with competing notions of the
island topos: nuclear waste dumping sites and gambling locales;
but also high security prisons, parks, reserves, tourism attractions
and associated product brands, missile practice targets, scientiﬁc
stations and military outposts. The Taiwanese experience conﬁrms
and illustrates how spatiality, and islandness in particular, needs to
be foregrounded within the current conceptualizations of
development.
Of course, it would be naive to assume that the strategy for the
offshore islands on the part of Taipei has been the outcome of a
carefully thought-out development policy; just as much as the re-
actions to such a vision have been coherent and consistent. Dem-
ocratic governance is messy, and the representations implicit in
different development trajectories e whether crafted top-down or
island-to-island e are multiple, unreﬁned and in ﬂux. In this paper,
we have tried to avoid the serious pitfalls of such a singularity. We
are also wary of archipelagic essentiality: there are competing vi-
sions and voiceswithin the government in Taipei, as much as within
the populations of the offshore islands, and within other organi-
zations and associations. What emerged from the pluri-vocality
surrounding both the casino and nuclear waste episodes is a
diverse coalition of concerns e often uniting speciﬁc metropolitan
with speciﬁc island (and aboriginal) interests e who shared a
common goal in blocking the intentions of central government. The
rich diversity that is celebrated in Taiwan’s island biology, geology
and culture now extends beyond, and pertains also to the slate of
representations about its islands’ presumed functions, develop-
ment trajectories and imagined sustainable futures.
With further improvements of late in the relationship between
Taipei and Beijing (Asia News, 2013; BBC News, 2012), Taiwan’s
islands may beneﬁt handsomely from an inﬂux of tourists from the
world’s most populous country. For example, as from 2008, guided
group tours started being allowed from mainland China to Taiwan;
and from June 2011, 500 Chinese tourists fromBeijing, Shanghai and
Xiamen are being allowed to enter Taiwan every day (Sui, 2011). In
the process, Taiwan’s offshore islands can expect a new round of
status adjustments; a new conceptualization of what it means to be
“on the edge” (Berry & Lu, 2005), or even at the centre. Perhaps the
focus for a future roundof a keenlycontestedmetageographywill lie
in determining what kinds of tourism development are most suit-
able for Taiwan’s offshore spaces and their residents. Such policies
are to be based on the (vague and potentially contradictory) prin-
ciples of sustainable development that seek to “boost their indus-
trial development, protect their natural ecological environment,
conserve their cultural features, enhance their quality of life and
improve the welfare of their residents” (Offshore Island
Development Fund Management Committee, 2005: Para. 1).
In the lingering power play between the People’s Republic of
China and the Republic of China/Taiwan, the latter has, since 1972,
been unable to represent itself in the United Nations and its afﬁliate
organizations. With some thawing of Taiwan Strait relations of late,
however, Beijing has been less obdurate: Taiwan has been ‘allowed’
to participate in a few international agencies, such as the Interna-
tional Olympic Committee, the World Health Organization, and the
World Trade Organization, but under the name of either ‘Chinese
Taipei’ or as the ‘Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu,
Kinmen andMatsu’ (WTO, 2013). It is somewhat prescient that such
“compromise” nomenclatures (Xu, 2006, p. 103) e only accepted
begrudgingly by the Taiwanese authorities e are so far the only ex-
amples of a semi-ofﬁcial recognition of Taiwan’s de facto archipelagic
identity. This identity presumably lends itself as a constructive
component of ongoing efforts at Taiwanization that go beyond
orchestrated moves towards de-Siniﬁcation (Li, 2013, p. 134).
Meanwhile, archipelagos remain a less examined metageog-
raphy. With the Bahamas in mind, Bethel (2000, p. 2) opines that
“[L]ittle has been written about the effects of geography on archi-
pelagic nations”. Thinkingwith the archipelago can change howwe
think about the world and our place in it (Pugh, 2013). These
include visions of inbordering and enclaving. Such a ‘turn’ fore-
grounds more ﬂuid tropes of assemblages, mobilities and multi-
plicities associated with islandeisland movements (Tsai, 2003). We
contend that the plurality of an archipelago can be elusive; it may
not easily lend itself to control and proﬁling; it may not settle
submissively into tight historical, cultural or discursive compart-
ments; it could defy coordination and organization; and it would
tend to express itself via a cacophony of voices, aspirations, iden-
tities and histories that clash with the ‘ofﬁcial’, smart logo, brand,
ofﬁcial identity and history of a pluri-island group (Baldacchino &
Ferreira, 2013). “Each island, however small, tends to have a
distinct history, certain unique cultural characteristics, and often its
own language or dialect” (Hamilton-Jones, 1992, p. 200); and many
more differences than these tend to lurk and linger in islandeisland
tensions (LaFlamme, 1983; Stratford et al., 2011). The unfolding
politics of Taiwan is now a better reﬂection, and a stronger
acknowledgement, of a long subdued, and differently uneven,
geographical plurality; a plurality that, however, is acknowledged
quite matter-of-factly in such unofﬁcial documents as Wikipedia:
This new constitutional government moved to Taipei, Taiwan in
1949 because of its military losses in the Chinese Civil War. It
remains in Taiwan and exercises control over other islands
including Penghu, Quemoy, Matsu, Itu Aba, and Pratas
(Wikipedia, 2013; underlines refer to hyperlinks in the original).
Taiwan is but one example where the obvious may not be
stated; consider, for example, the analysis of the United Kingdom as
“an Atlantic archipelago” (Pocock, 2005, p. 29); of Australia’s
shifting identity as island, continent, nation and archipelago
(Perera, 2009); and of the consciousness of the Japanese state as a
shimaguni (island nation) and its possible bearing on how it tackles
the escalating tensions in the China Sea (Suwa, 2012). Similar on-
tologies, with their own (re)constructions of geo-politics, may also
be proﬁtably deployed on/for other archipelagos, which are more
“terribly common” (Bethel, 2000, p. 2) than one might think.
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